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Abstract
When the relevance or, practice of international tribunals is impugned their tendency 
often is to resort to ‘vivere-existential reflexes’. This habit can incubate conflict between 
the particular tribunal and the requirements of General Principles of Law recognized 
by civilized nations. This risks disunity between international law, supranational law 
and domestic law. This article examines the International Criminal Court’s (icc) ap-
plication and interpretation of Article 87 of the Rome Statute (1998) under the light 
of nemo judex in parte sua – a general principle of law recognized by civilized nations. 
The article recommends that an observatory for monitoring International Tribunals’ 
compliance with general principles of law recognized by civilized nations should be 
established and a database on non-compliance should be developed and maintained. 
This should check practice of international tribunals for consistency with general prin-
ciples of law recognized by civilized nations in a manner that promotes the integrity 
of international law.
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…. impartiality is the fundamental qualification of a judge and the core 
attribute of the judiciary.1
…
One of the cornerstones of our legal system is the impartiality of the tri-
bunals by which justice is administered. In civil litigation the guiding 
principle is that no one may be a judge in his own cause: nemo debet 
esse judex in propria causa. It is a principle which is applied much more 
widely than a literal interpretation of the words might suggest. It is not 
confined to cases where the judge is a party to the proceedings. It is ap-
plied also to cases where he has a personal or pecuniary interest in the 
outcome, however small.
lord hope of craighead, ex parte pinochet ugarte no.3 [1999]
⸪
1 Introduction
General principles of law recognized by civilized nations are a seminal source 
of international law. Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of 
Justice2 (icj) prescribes inter alia that the principal judicial organ of the un − 
the icj − whose function is to decide international disputes submitted to it, 
shall apply norms from the following specific sources:
a. International conventions, whether general or particular, establishing 
rules expressly recognized by the contesting states.
b. International custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as 
Law.
c. The general principles of law recognized by civilized nations.
1 I am indebted to Shalom Malaika Chigara for her assistance and encouragement. Canadian 
Judicial Council, Ethical Principles for Judges (Canadian Judicial Council, Ottawa, Ontario 
1998), p. 30.
2 Statute of the International Court of Justice (1945), 33 unts 993.
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Nemo judex in parte sua is an exemplar of general principles of law recognized 
by most judicial systems of the world. Therefore, its observance by the icc3 
should be mandatory. icc jurisdiction is applicable where States parties that 
have primary responsibility over the offences are either unable or, unwilling to 
prosecute them.
The icc has provoked extremely divergent and even challenging reac-
tions from its Member States parties (msps) threatening paralysis of relations 
between the un Security Council and the African Union; and also between 
 African States and Western States generally4 over exercise of icc mandate to 
prosecute individuals alleged to have committed Article 5 crimes under the 
Rome Statute (1998).
This is rather unfortunate because of the hope that establishment of the icc 
had inspired when the Court came into force on 1 July 2002. The operational-
ization of the icc has been roundly acclaimed by international constitutional-
ism5 theorists as further strong evidence for the proposition that international 
institutions are diminishing State power as the basis of international order. 
Perju writes that, ‘[a]s the locus of political will moves beyond the legal form 
of the State, constitutionalism becomes the tool of choice for conceptualizing 
new forms of power and for structuring—and, yes, limiting—the exercise of 
power’.6
Nonetheless, perceived bias in the emergent implementation of icc juris-
diction, seemingly in disregard of General Principles of Law recognized by 
3 Established by the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, (adopted 17 July 1998, 
entered into force 1 July 2002), 2187 unts 90.
4 See also Mandiaye Niang, ‘Africa and the Legitimacy of the icc in Question’, 17 International 
Criminal Law Review (2017) 615–624; Dire Tladi, ‘The African Union and the International 
Criminal Court: The battle for the soul of international law’, 34 South African Yearbook of 
International Law (2009) 57–69; Charles Chernor Jalloh, ‘Africa and the International Crimi-
nal Court: Collision Course or Cooperation?’, 34 North Carolina Central Law Review (2012) 
203–229; Jean-Baptiste J. Vilmer, ‘The African Union and the International Criminal Court: 
Counteracting the Crisis’, 92 International Affairs (2016) 1319–1342.
5 See especially Jeffrey L. Dunoff, et al. (eds.), Ruling the World? Constitutionalism, International 
Law and Global Governance (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2009); Armin von Bog-
dandy, ‘Constitutionalism in International Law: Comment on a Proposal from Germany’, 47 
Harvard International Law Journal (2006) 223–242; Christine E.J. Schwoebel, ‘Situating the 
Debate on Global Constitutionalism’, 8 International Journal of Constitutional Law (2010) 
611–635; Anne Peters, ‘Constitutional Fragments: On the Interaction of Constitutionalization 
and Fragmentation in International Law’, Working Paper No. 2, Centre for Global Constitution-
alism, University of St Andrews, http://cgc.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/files/2015/04/CGC-Working 
-Paper-No-2-Constitutional-Fragments.pdf, accessed 17 July 2018.
6 Vlad Perju, ‘International Constitutionalism and the State: A Reply to Aiofe O’Donoghue’, 11 
International Journal of Constitutional Law (2013) 1046–1051.
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 civilized nations threatens Perju’s hope. O’Donoghue has aptly summed up the 
consequent emergent dilemma thus: ‘As long as a State’s actions as part of an 
international constitutional order remain unresolved, the process of constitu-
tionalisation itself cannot be said to be complete or indeed legitimate’.7 One 
could say the actions of the Republic of South Africa in the Al Bashir debacle 
with the icc (2015) remain legally unresolved, i.e. with no remedy, even after 
Trial Chamber ii’s decision of 6 July 2017.
1.1 Background
On 6 July 2017, Pre-Trial Chamber ii of the icc gave its decision in a matter 
raised against the Republic of South Africa pursuant to Article 87 of the Rome 
Statute (1998). This decision was in the context of the outstanding 2009/2010 
indictment of President Al Bashir of Sudan allegedly for crimes against hu-
manity, genocide, and war crimes − what du Plessis8 calls the holy trinity of 
crimes.
The Chamber stated that msps to the Rome Statute are constrained to ex-
ecute warrants of arrest issued by the Court and to implement icc requests for 
the arrest and surrender of fugitives to the Court. Therefore,
by not arresting Omar Al-Bashir while he was on its territory between 13 
and 15 June 2015, the Republic of South Africa had failed to comply with 
the icc’s request for the arrest and surrender of Omar Al-Bashir contrary 
to the provisions of the Statute, thereby preventing the Court from exer-
cising its functions and powers under the Statute in connection with the 
criminal proceedings instituted against Omar Al-Bashir.9
1.2 The Problem
The decision points to international law’s enduring deficit of reliance on State 
collaboration with international institutions for possible realization of its 
7 Aoife O’Donoghue, ‘International constitutionalism and the State’, 11 International Journal of 
Constitutional Law (2013) 1021–1045.
8 Max du Plessis, ‘The Omar Al-Bashir Case: Exploring Efforts to Resolve the Tension between 
the African Union and the International Criminal Court’, in T. Maluwa, et al. (eds.), The Pur-
suit of a Brave New World in International Law, (Brill Nijhoff, Leiden, 2017) pp. 431–467, p. 433.
9 The Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, 06 July 2017, icc, Pre-Trial Chamber ii, 
Decision – Court Room 1, icc-02/05–01/09, <www.icc-cpi.int/Transcripts/CR2017_04432 
.PDF> accessed 17 July 2018. See also Press release at icc website ‘Al-Bashir case: icc Pre-
Trial Chamber ii decides not to refer the Republic of South Africa’s non-cooperation to 
the asp or the unsc’ (6 July 2017), www.icccpi.int/legalAidConsultations?name=pr1320, ac-
cessed 17 July 2018.
Downloaded from Brill.com03/05/2019 12:55:19PM
via Brunel University
 5A NEMO JUDEX IN PARTE SUA | doi 10.1163/15718123-01806004
international criminal law review (2018) 1-33
204248
 purposes. This conundrum does not and should not absolve the testing of icc 
Pre-Trial Chamber ii’s decision of 6 July 2017 against the Republic of South 
Africa for consistency with the maxim nemo judex in parte sua - a general prin-
ciple of international law that prohibits all from adjudicating cases in which 
they are an interested party.10 This is to ensure that justice is not only done, but 
is seen to be done.11
This impartiality test requires disqualification from participation anyone 
that may give rise even to the slightest apprehension of bias in the proceedings. 
It is a fundamental principle of natural justice12 that belongs in that category of 
general principles of law recognised by civilised nations −Article 38(1)(c) of the 
Statute of the International Court of Justice (1946).13
The only respondent in the process was the Republic of South Africa. The 
sole accuser was the icc itself and not the Assembly of States Parties (asp), 
nor the un Security Council that had triggered the icc’s attention in the mat-
ter of crimes allegedly committed by the Sudanese President against his own 
people in the Darfur region. It would be naïve to argue that it was not the icc 
that had brought Article 87 charges against the Republic of South Africa but 
rather, the Prosecutor of the icc; and also that it was the Court’s duty to hear 
and consider the pleadings of the Prosecutor, and then to weigh them against 
any arguments proffered in response by the Republic of South Africa chiefly 
because there is no institution anywhere under international law of the ‘in-
ternational crimes prosecutor’. Thus, specific prosecution functions had to be 
established and assigned recently for ad hoc Tribunals for Yugoslavia, Rwanda, 
Lebanon, Cambodia, etc.
Thus, the dynamic of the icc established by the Rome Statute (1998) to en-
sure international criminal justice refers to the activities of the icc and not 
to any one part that could not exist outside of the Rome Statute 1998. Gestalt 
Psychology14 is clear that the whole is something else than the sum of its parts. 
How the Prosecutor of the icc and the Tribunal operate is authorised by one 
and the same Statute so much that, to insist that it was not the icc that had 
10 Regina v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No 2), 
15 Jan 1999, hl [1999] All er 577.
11 Millar v. Dickson, 24 Jul 2001, pc, [2002] sc 30, p. 63; Rex v. Sussex Justices, ex parte McCar-
thy [1923] All er 233, [1924] 1 kb 256, p. 259.  
12 See especially Abimbola A. Olowofoyeku, ‘Bias in Collegiate Courts’, 65(4) International 
and Comparative Law Quarterly (2016) 895–926; Gabrielle Appleby and Stephene McDon-
ald, ‘Pride and Prejudice: A Case for Reform of Judicial Recusal Procedure’, 20 Legal Ethics 
1(2017) 89–114.
13 Statute of the International Court of Justice (1945) 33 unts 993.
14 See also Charlotte Sills et al., An Introduction to Gestalt (Sage Publishing, London, 2012) 
pp. 45–60.
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charged the Republic of South Africa with non-compliance; or that it was not 
the icc that handed down the decision may appropriately be deemed to be-
long to the realm of fanciful abstraction and intellectual myopia. The sum of it is 
plain and simple. The Rome Statute’s current regime and dynamic for pursuing 
international criminal justice is what is under observation. It is not the Pros-
ecutor’s justice, neither is it the specific trial chamber’s justice but only that of 
the icc. Could it be said for instance that it was not the England Football Team 
Captain Harry Kane that scored from the penalty spot against Panama in the 
recent World Cup tournament held in Russia, but only his left foot that had 
sunk the ball into the goalkeeper’s nets?
The Republic of South Africa was charged with failing to cooperate with the 
Court to ensure that a fugitive that had landed on its territory was apprehend-
ed and surrendered to the icc. This charge appears to conflict with operation 
of the basic and general principle of natural justice: nemo judex in parte sua. If 
this is possibly the case could icc practice trump this principle without violat-
ing international law as the law from nations? How if at all, could any concerns 
about the Republic of South Africa’s alleged non-compliance with the icc over 
the Al Bashir arrest warrants have been addressed without breaching the natu-
ral justice strictures entailed in the principle - nemo judex in parte sua?
This article evaluates the process envisioned under Article 87(7) of the Rome 
Statute (1998) for ensuring msps’ compliance with the Court’s possible re-
quests to arrest and surrender fugitives under the light of the of the nemo judex 
in parte sua principle.15 It tentatively argues that perhaps Pre-Trial Chamber 
ii’s decision is defective on account of the nemo judex in parte sua principle. 
Nonetheless, Trial Chamber ii’s decision appears inevitable because of Article 
87(7) of the Rome Statute (1998) – the enabling provision. The Drafters of the 
Rome Statute (1998) do not appear to have either inscribed or, compensated 
for the role of the nemo judex in parte sua principle in the logic of Article 87(7).
The unintended consequence of the Drafters’ possible omission has played 
out in the judgment against the Republic of South Africa by Pre-Trial Chamber 
ii. If so, this position could be remedied possibly by revising Article 87(7) of 
the Rome Statute (1998) so that it inscribes rather than exclude as it presently 
does, significance of the nemo judex in parte sua principle in all icc proceed-
ings. The revision would serve to minimise the potential for conflict injected 
into the icc dynamic via the current dependence of the icc on msps’ coopera-
tion for the enforcement of its arrest warrants.
Amending Article 87(7) seems to be the most straightforward way to correct 
this problem chiefly because it would otherwise be impracticable to seek to 
15 See also Hans Kelsen, The General Theory of Law and State (Russel and Russel, New York, 
1945).
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amend a general principle of law recognised by civilized nations only to cater 
for operational defects in the emergent international criminal justice system. 
Moreover, general principles of international law recognized by civilized na-
tions regulate other areas of international law, including trade law, marine law, 
environmental law, etc.
2 Existential Issues in the Practice of the icc
Existential hallucinations might have dimmed icc Chamber ii’s wit as often 
happens when emergent international tribunals’ credibility is impugned, par-
ticularly in their early years. Huge existential and functional questions have 
been circling over the icc in the last ten years, as happened with the icj until 
the Corfu Channel case16 arose between the uk and Albania.
2.1 Lessons from icj ‘vivere-Existential Reflex’ Practice
In the Corfu Channel case, the icj appeared to play the magician’s hand with 
customary international law-making, most probably to justify its four-year in-
action with human resources costs to the un. In a sense, the arrival the Corfu 
Channel case at the Court was a much welcome distraction from critics who 
saw it as a white elephant.
However, the Corfu Channel case proved to be less than a blessing for the 
icj’s existential questions at the time. Albania, the Respondent party, was not 
even a member of the un, and it also had not previously formally recognised 
the jurisdiction of the icj. It also had not ratified the one treaty in interna-
tional law that the Applicant – the uk – had attempted to mount its case upon 
for damage to her vessels in Albanian territorial waters while exercising the 
right of innocent passage.
These circumstances did not caution or hinder a very enthusiastic icj 
from proceeding. For the Court, it probably would have been unthinkable at 
the time, to make a declaration of non-liquet.17 The icj proceeded brazenly 
to  disregard custom’s secondary rules of recognition18 and to straightaway in-
augurate a new norm of customary international law on the duty of common 
16 Corfu Channel (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. Albania), 9 April 
1949, International Court of Justice, icj Reports 1949, p. 41.
17 A situation where there appears to be no applicable law. See also Neha Jain, ‘Judicial Law-
making and General Principles of Law in International Criminal Law’, 57 Harvard Interna-
tional Law Journal (2016) 111–150, p. 114.
18 See also Ben Chigara, Legitimacy Deficit in Custom: A Deconstructionist Critique (Ashgate, 
Dartmouth, 2001), Chapter 5.
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humanity to warn others coming into one’s territorial waters, of the hazards 
they might expose themselves to.
Even the applicants, who were then a great naval power, had not in all their 
pleadings suggested the existence of such a rule of customary international 
law. In other words, there had been no previous State practice or claims by 
States to suggest the existence of such a rule under Article 38(1)(b) of the Stat-
ute of the icj.
Nonetheless, and without even the faintest reference to either evidence of 
State practice or to evidence of opinion juris sive necessitatis that are both re-
quired to inaugurate a new norm of customary international law, the icj just 
declared it, and, on that basis, found Albania liable for damage to the British 
vessels.
In doing so, the icj appeared to have indulged itself in ‘ vivere-existential 
reflexes’. Ever since that decision of the Court, custom has been tainted with 
unreliability as a source of law-making in international law. Generations of 
scholars have problematized custom’s legitimacy, with many calling for its de-
nunciation as a viable source of international law.19
2.2 Emergent icc ‘vivere-Existential Reflex’ Practice
Similarly, and for the best part of its existence to date, the icc has haemor-
rhaged both the integrity20 and the legitimacy21 that are required of a judicial 
19 See especially Joel P. Trachtman, ‘The obsolescence of Customary International Law’ (21 
October 2014), <ssrn.com/abstract=2512757>, accessed 17 July 2018; Jack L. Goldsmith and 
Eric A. Posner, ‘A Theory of Customary International Law’, 66 University of Chicago Law 
Review (1999) 1113–1178; Patrick J. Kelly, ‘The Twilight of cil’, 40 Virginia Journal of Interna-
tional Law (2000) 449–543; Bin Cheng, ‘un Resolutions on outer Space’, 5 Indian Journal 
of International Law (1965) 23–48; Ben Chigara, ‘International Tribunal for the Law of the 
Sea and Customary International Law’, 22 Loyola of Los Angeles Comparative and Interna-
tional Law Review (2000) 433–452; Jean Marie Henckaerts, ‘Study on customary interna-
tional humanitarian law: A Contribution to the Understanding and Respect for the Rule 
of Law in Armed Conflict’, 87 International Review of the Red Cross (2005) 175–212; Mario 
Prost and Paul K. Clark, ‘Unity, Diversity & the Fragmentation of International Law’, 5 
Chinese Journal of International Law (2006) 341–370; Edward Swaine, ‘Rational Custom’, 52 
Duke Law Journal (2002) 559–627.
20 See Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Fontana Press, London, 1986) pp. 225–54. See also 
Michael F. Freeman, Lloyd’s Introduction to Jurisprudence (9th ed. Sweet and Maxwell, 
 London, 2014) pp. 599–608; D. Robinson, ‘The Identity Crisis of International Law’, 21 
Leiden Journal of International Law (2008) 925–963.
21 See Thomas Franck, The Power of Legitimacy among Nations (oup, Oxford, 1990) pp. 41–9.
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tribunal of any standing. Stuart22 has appropriately criticised the Court for 
amateurism, for a failure to carry out reliable, independent investigations, and 
for relying on materials provided by the un, ngos and other third parties. In 
the Lubanga case,23 the Trial Chamber relied on documents obtained from un 
and ngo sources, while accepting that ‘persons working for ngos were the 
exclusive intermediaries between the Office of the Prosecutor (otp) and the 
victims and witnesses’.24 This is practice contrary to the nemo judex in parte 
sua principle.
Stuart’s veiled criticisms of icc’s reckless approach to basic criminal law 
practice strike at the heart of the integrity of the Court’s practice. ‘Independent 
investigations by the otp on the ground are still a minor factor or even non-
existent, as in the case in Darfur’.25 She also criticises the Court for abusing the 
confidentiality and non-disclosure provisions in Article 54(3)(e) of the Rome 
Statute. The otp has a duty under Article 67(2) to disclose, as soon as prac-
ticable, material in the Prosecutor’s possession or control that s/he believes 
shows or tends toward strengthening the accused’s innocence; that mitigates 
the accused’s guilt; or that may affect the credibility of prosecution evidence. 
This duty is so mundane among domestic legal systems that it is not necessary 
to belabour the point here.
Dicker, a self-declared friend of the icc, has commented on ‘self-inflicted’ 
damage to the Court’s integrity. Some of the damage emanates from what he 
correctly describes as the Court’s daunting mandate. I will return to this daunt-
ing, even ambitious mandate of the icc project towards the end, and then of-
fer suggestions to support the Court’s mission. He writes that:
Challenges the icc has faced so far include the slow pace of the first and 
only completed trial; the difficulty of the court making its proceedings 
relevant in the communities most affected by the crimes thousands of 
miles from The Hague; flaws in prosecutorial strategy in investigating and 
selecting cases; and most recently, intense budget pressure from the larg-
est paying states parties. Some of these problems flow from the court’s 
daunting mandate, while others are more self-inflicted.26
22 Heikelina Verrijn Stuart ,‘The icc in Trouble’, 6 Journal of International Criminal Justice 
(2008) 409–417.
23 The Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, 14 March 2012, icc, Trial Chamber, 01/04-0106.
24 Verrijn Stuart, supra note 22, p. 409.
25 Ibid., p. 414.
26 Richard Dicker, ‘The icc at 10’, 12 Washington University Global Studies Law Review (2013) 
539–544, p. 539.
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Writing in her personal capacity, Judge and President of the Trial Division at 
the icc Joyce Aluoch27 laments inter alia, serious icc challenges with ensuring 
the fair treatment of accused persons. She laments too the icc’s capacity to 
achieve expeditious prosecutions. Language difficulties are an issue at the icc. 
They severely exercised Trial Chamber iv in Prosecutor v. Banda and Jerbo,28 
and seriously hindered a fair and expeditious hearing of the case, particularly 
because each of the accused only understood one language − Zaghawa. Za-
ghawa ‘is not a written language… . [Its] vocabulary is limited to no more than 
5,000 words, rendering it difficult to translate certain words and concepts from 
languages of the Court such as English, French and Arabic into Zaghawa’.29
Consequently, the material that needed to be translated and disclosed 
reached around 3,700 pages.30 This challenge took the Court into the realms of 
‘creative problem solving’ in order to ensure that the trial followed the practice 
directions set in the Rome Statute.31 But procedural creativity is discretionary 
and risks inconsistency and arbitrariness – the very antipathies of justice. In 
particular, they raise challenges around the equal treatment of accused per-
sons under the Rome Statute, even for the same offence.32 Jain argues that ju-
dicial creativity by international criminal courts is deeply problematic, fitful, 
contradictory, and often misguided. It has the potential to ‘fail to comply with 
the principle of legality in criminal law, especially the requirements of fairness 
and notice to the accused’.33
Serious strategic shortcomings for a court mandated to prosecute often 
powerful and versatile persons in terms of their protection from arrest in their 
native zones of operation include the Court’s dependence on msps to act as its 
27 Joyce Aluoch, ‘Ten years of trial proceedings at the International Criminal Court’, 12 Wash-
ington University Global Studies Law Review (2013) 433–450.
28 Prosecutor v. Banda and Jerbo, Judgment of 17 February 2012, icc, 02/05-03/09-214.
29 Aluoch, supra note 27, p. 436.
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid., p. 437.
32 Emphasising the role of Article 38(1)(c) premised discretion in the production of judg-
ments, see especially Christopher A. Ford, ‘Judicial Discretion in International Jurispru-
dence: Article 38(1)(c) and General Principles of Law’, 5 Duke Journal of International and 
Comparative Law (1994) 35–86. Advocating judicial discretion to fill gaps in international 
criminal law, see Shane Darcy and Joseph Powderly (eds.), Judicial Creativity at the In-
ternational Criminal Tribunals (oup, Oxford, 2010). See also ‘Dworkin and Discretion’, in 
Michael F. Freeman, Lloyd’s Introduction to Jurisprudence (9th ed. Sweet and Maxwell, 
London, 2014) pp. 596–7.
33 Jain, supra note 17, p. 112.
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primary compliance arm. ‘[T]he Court lacks any direct power to carry out the 
arrests of those people indicted for crimes within its jurisdiction’.34
Current State practice shows that the hopes of the Draftsmen of the Rome 
Statute (1998) that States would facilitate the arrest and surrender of accused 
persons has proved illusory. In fact, this has proved to be the fundamental fault 
line in the strategic architecture of the icc project. Even worse, attempts by 
the Court to foist that compliance by implementing Article 87(7) have created 
enormous difficulties all-round. For the icc project to remain on track and 
possibly succeed, its strategy for apprehending fugitives requires a radical re-
think and re-formulation.
With all these and other challenges and criticisms,35 it is not surprising that 
some of the icc’s recent practices can only be described as vivere-existential 
reflexes. For instance, the icc’s disregard of nemo judex in parte sua, evidenced 
in the charges of non-compliance against Chad and Malawi (2011),36 and more 
recently against the Republic of South Africa (2017), is incomprehensible.
Moreover, the icc has been accused of focusing on and targeting African 
States because of their weak regional standing in world affairs. It has also been 
criticised for projecting Africans as if they dominated the inhumanity that 
underlies Article 5 crimes that the Court is mandated to prosecute.37 Human 
Rights Watch Director Kenneth Roth writes that:
Some of the icc’s problems are of its own making. The Chief Prosecu-
tor for its first nine years, Luis Moreno Ocampo of Argentina, seemed 
more interested in issuing arrest warrants than undertaking the tough, 
less glamorous work of conducting rigorous criminal investigations. So 
far six of the thirty-one prosecutions he launched—three in Kenya, two 
in Congo, and one in Sudan—have been withdrawn, dismissed, or led to 
acquittal due to lack of evidence.38
34 Matthew Gillet, ‘Fighting Impunity: Assisted Arrests at the icc’, 3 Yale Journal of Interna-
tional Affairs (2008) 16–32.
35 See also Malick N. Mandiaye, ‘Africa and the Legitimacy of the icc in Question’, 17 In-
ternational Criminal Law Review (2017) 615–624; Courtney Hillebrecht and Scott Straus, 
‘Who Pursues the Perpetrators: State Cooperation with the icc’, 39 Human Rights Quar-
terly (2017) 162–188.
36 International Legal Materials Vol. 51, No. 2 (2012), pp. 393–417; icc-02/05-01/09-302 
 06-07-2017 53/53 rh pt.
37 Kenneth Roth, ‘Africa Attacks the icc’, (14 January 2014) Human Rights Watch, https://
www.hrw.org/news/2014/01/14/africa-attacks-international-criminal-court, accessed 17 
July 2018.
38 Ibid.
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In 2009, and again in 2010, icc arrest warrants were issued against Sudanese 
President Al Bashir alleging war crimes, crimes against humanity, and geno-
cide allegedly committed in the Darfur region.39 The African Union has rou-
tinely criticized these arrest warrants and denounced the un Security Council 
for its role in this development.40
In spite of Article 86 obligations upon msps of the Rome Statue to ‘cooper-
ate fully with the Court in its investigation and prosecution of crimes within 
the jurisdiction of the Court’, African States have preferred to comply instead 
with au Resolutions that require them not to comply with icc and un Secu-
rity Council mandates for the arrest and surrender of President Al Bashir. This 
has been adduced as evidence of an emerging au supranational constitutional 
customary international law.41 Could this counter-icc African regional State 
practice be superior to international law?
2.3 icc ‘vivere-Existential Reflex’ Practice v. au Supranational Laws
The only parallel to emergent au supranational constitutional customary 
 international law is supranational European Union Law. The Court of Justice 
of the European Union’s (cjeu) 2008 decision in the Kadi cases42 that delib-
erately challenged un Security Council orders to freeze assets of persons sus-
pected of funding international terrorism is instructive. The cjeu insisted that 
 unless such orders comply with the requirements of the rule-of-law, they shall 
be treated as null and void in the eu. In paragraph 378 of its judgment, the 
Court concluded that, ‘Mr Kadi and Al Barakaat’s appeals must be upheld 
and … the contested regulation must be annulled in so far as it concerns the 
appellants…’
Since the promulgation of the 2009 and 2010 arrest warrants against Presi-
dent Al Bashir, several African States have hosted President Al Bashir and 
declined to cooperate with contemporaneous icc requests for his arrest and 
surrender to the Court. They include Chad, Kenya, Djibouti, Malawi and more 
39 Theorising Rome Statute Article 5 crimes, see especially David Luban, ‘A Theory of Crimes 
Against Humanity’, 29 Yale Journal of International Law (2004) 85–167.
40 See du Plessis, supra note 8, p. 440.
41 Ben Chigara, ‘The administration of International Law in National Courts and the Legiti-
macy of International Law’, 17 International Criminal Law Review (2017) 909–934.
42 Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International 
Foundation v. Council of the European Union and Commission of the European Communi-
ties, Grand Chamber decision of 2008, ecj, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/
TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:62005CJ0402&from=EN> accessed 17 July 2018.
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recently the Republic of South Africa.43 It has become almost a badge of hon-
our among African States to host President Al Bashir of Sudan and to scoff at 
corresponding icc requests for his arrest and surrender.
The icc strategy of referring non-complying African States to the un 
 Security Council for failure to turn-in President Al Bashir has achieved no 
significant result either. In fact, it appears to have emboldened au defiance 
of the Court, leading to the recent Pre-Trial Chamber ii’s decision against the 
Republic of South Africa on 6 July 2017. Surprisingly the decision did not in-
clude a referral to the un Security Council for South Africa’s declared non-
compliance. For its own part, the un Security Council appears to be unwilling 
to take any action after a declaration of non-compliance - Chad and Malawi 
being examples.
The ‘realism’ of the un Security Council to take no action after Pre-Trial 
Chamber i’s referral of Chad and Malawi for failure to comply with the Court’s 
requests;44 and of Pre-Trial Chamber ii’s shying away from referring the Re-
public of South Africa to the un Security Council45 probably points to a recog-
nition in both cases of what might be presently feasible in international crimi-
nal law and what may still be premature.
Secondly, it points to a legitimacy defeating fault-line in the crafting of the 
Court’s enforcement mechanisms in light of international law’s dependence 
on States for the enforcement of its terms. Legitimacy46 refers also to an insti-
tution’s pull of its addressees towards voluntary compliance.
Thirdly, it points to the current underdevelopment of international law gen-
erally. It appears premature to even expect international law to ensure interna-
tional criminal justice without the consent of States.
Each icc judicial decision immediately begs the question of enforcement. 
The linking of judicial findings47 to un Executive action is problematic  because 
43 See also Alexander K.A. Greenwalt, ‘Introductory Note to the icc: Decisions Pursuant to 
Article 87(7) of the Rome Statute on the Failure by the Republic of Malawi and the Repub-
lic of Chad to Comply with the Cooperation Requests Issued by the Court with Respect to 
the Arrest and Surrender of Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir and African Union Response’, 
51 International Legal Materials (2012) 393–417.
44 See icc-02/05-01/09-140-tENG 23-03-2012 1/9 nm pt, paras. 13 and 14.
45 See icc-02/05-01/09-302 06-07-2017 53/53 rh pt, para. 140.
46 Thomas M. Franck, The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations (oup, Oxford, 1990) p. 38.
47 See also Martha Minow, et al. The First Global Prosecutor: Promise and Constraints (Law, 
Meaning, and Violence) (University of Michigan Press, Michigan, 2015); Hirad Abtahi and 
Steven A. Koh, ‘The Emerging Enforcement Practice of the International Criminal Court’, 
45 Cornell International Law Journal (2012) 1–23.
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of its discretionary nature. Pre-Trial Chamber i referred Chad and Malawi for 
possible un Security Council action while Pre-Trial Chamber ii did not refer 
the Republic of South Africa in spite of similar findings.
It points to a very weak mechanism for the enforcement of icc decisions. It 
is an unsustainable link to the extent that it renders sterile any icc findings or 
declarations of non-compliance if the un Security Council does nothing about 
them, as long as the defiant msps maintain their ‘recalcitrant’ conduct.
This link is concerning also because the un Security Council exercises 
only political executive authority while the icc and other international tri-
bunals exercise only judicial authority. Political and judicial competences at 
the moment are conflated when the icc refers to the un Security Council 
msps for non-cooperation with their obligations under Articles 86 and 87 of 
the Rome Statute (1998). This is problematic. It might be a factor contribut-
ing to non-cooperation with icc requests, particularly among those groups 
of States that have been calling for democratization and reform of the un 
Security Council to reflect what they themselves perceive as the new world 
order.48
Among African States, receiving icc declarations of non-compliance with 
requests for cooperation appear to have become a prized solidarity symbol 
against the nagging kicks of perceived neo-imperialism in the continent’s af-
fairs. One tentative solution to this might be to develop a list of powers that 
can be applied against a msp found to have failed the ‘obligation to cooperate 
with icc test’. Of course, the question of who decides the prior question of fact 
is still a very important question not least because of the lingering require-
ments imposed by the nemo judex in parte sua principle qua customary inter-
national law.
Modest fines and a decency ranking chart that is reviewed periodically with 
States going up or down the scale depending on their practice are possible op-
tions. Other international institutions might begin to refer to such a decency 
ranking chart when considering possible dealings with other States, thereby 
incentivising greater decency among icc msps in their handling of cooperation 
requests in the long run.
48 See especially Sahar Okhovat, ‘The United Nations Security Council: Its Veto Power and Its 
Reform’, cpacs Working Paper No. 15/1, University of Sydney (December 2011), <sydney.
edu.au/arts/peace_conflict/docs/working_papers/UNSC_paper.pdf>, accessed 17 July 
2018.
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2.4 Intensifying au Supranationalism v. International Executive 
Authority of the un Security Council
Following Pre-Trial Chamber I’s declaration of non-compliance against Chad 
and Malawi,49 the au Commission expressed its total disagreement with the 
decisions of the Pre-Trial Chamber I and declared on 9 January 2012 that the 
earlier au Assembly Declarations on non-cooperation with un Security Coun-
cil and icc arrest warrants against President Al Bashir remained binding on au 
member States parties.50 A month later, the au Assembly issued a Declaration 
reminding African States of their obligation under au Law, not to comply with 
any future requests of the icc and mandated the au Commission to ‘consider 
seeking an Advisory Opinion from the International Court of Justice regarding 
the immunities of State Officials under international law’.51
The Republic of South Africa’s ruling African National Congress reacted to 
the interim prohibitive travel order52 against Al Bashir issued by the North 
Guateng Division of the High Court of the Republic of South Africa with the 
statement that the icc had lost its relevance.53 President Jacob Zuma is on 
record for emphasizing that there is an unequivocal au position on the icc 
and that ‘… the United Nations Security Council should have listened to Africa 
before issuing the interdict’ against President Al Bashir of Sudan.54 Perhaps 
by not acting upon the Chad and Malawi referrals of the icc upon its finding 
that the two had each failed the Article 87(7) compliance test, the un Security 
Council has now begun to listen to the au policy on the icc.
This African position is also evident in the outcomes of the lex specialis ‘au 
Extraordinary Summit on Africa-icc Relationship’ held on 12 October 2013 by 
49 The Prosecutor v. Omar Al Bashir, 19 October 2011, icc, Pre-Trial Chamber I, 02/05-01/09, 
<http://www.worldcourts.com/icc/eng/decisions/2011.10.19_Prosecutor_v_Al_Bashir 
.pdf>, accessed 17 July 2018; Greenwalt, supra note 43, p. 397.
50 Ibid., p. 393.
51 Ibid.
52 Southern Africa Litigation Centre v. the Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 
& 9 Others, North Gauteng hc, Pretoria, Case No. 27740/15.
53 See also Owen Bowcott and Jamie Grierson, ‘Sudan’s President barred from leaving South 
Africa’, The Guardian, 15 June 2015, www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/14/sudan 
-president-omar-al-bashir-south-africa-icc, accessed 17 July 2018.
54 Bathandwa Mbola, ‘au leaders will not extradite Al Bashir’ South African Government 
News Agency (6 July 2009), <www.sanews.gov.za/south-africa/au-leaders-will-not-extra 
dite-al-bashir>, accessed 17 July 2018.
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the highest decision-making organ of the au – the Assembly.55 It decided inter 
alia:
1) That no International Court or Tribunal has capacity to commence or to 
continue charges against any serving au Head of State or Government 
or anybody acting or entitled to act in such capacity during their term of 
office.
2) To fast track the establishment of the criminal jurisdiction of the African 
Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights and to table for discussion at the 
Assembly of State Parties of the icc, amendments to the icc on immu-
nity of heads of state and government among other matters.56
The au position is apparent from State practice which clearly follows au su-
pranational directives and trumps icc and un Security Council orders. Chad 
hosted President Al Bashir in July 2010 at a summit of the Sahel Saharan States 
held in N’Djamena, thereby becoming the first State Party to the Rome Statute 
to harbour ‘knowingly and willingly a fugitive…wanted by the Court’ and at-
tracting severe criticism from ngos and observers.57
The abjuration was based on the assumption that Chad, as a State Party to 
the Rome Statute, would arrest, detain and facilitate transfer formalities to The 
Hague, any person of interest to the icc. Subsequently, President Al Bashir 
was hosted on two occasions in 2010, by the Republic of Kenya -  another 
State Party to the Rome Statute -, as a guest of the Kenyan government during 
the August celebrations that marked the occasion of Kenya’s new Constitu-
tion. He was hosted a second time as a participant to a summit for the Inter- 
Governmental Authority for Development (igad) held in Nairobi in  October 
2010 to discuss the forthcoming referendum for the secession of Southern 
Sudan from Sudan.
At a meeting which took place in New York in the aftermath of President 
Al Bashir’s visit to Kenya, between the President of the icc Assembly of State 
55 au Extraordinary Summit on Africa-icc Relationship, Ext/Assembly/AU/Dec.1(Oct.2013); 
see also S.A. Dersso, ‘The au’s Extraordinary Summit decisions on Africa-icc Relationship’ 
ejil: Talk (2013), www.ejiltalk.org/the-aus-extraordinary-summit-decisions-on-africa-icc 
-relationship/, accessed 17 July 2018.
56 au Extraordinary Summit on Africa-icc Relationship, Ext/Assembly/AU/Dec.1 (Oct. 2013).
57 Johan David van der Vyer, ‘Prosecuting the President of Sudan: A dispute between the 
African Union and the International Court’, 11 African Human Rights Law Journal (2011) 
683–698, p. 686.
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 Parties (asp), Ambassador Christian Wenaweser of Liechtenstein, and the 
 Kenyan Minister of Foreign Affairs; Kenya explained that it had refused to ex-
ecute the arrest warrant because it believed that it had ‘competing obligations 
toward the Court, the au, and regional peace and stability’.58 Du Plessis’ argu-
ment on this point is inconsistent with the enablence object and purpose test 
of diplomatic relations declared by the icj in the Case Concerning the Arrest 
Warrant of 11 April 2000 (drc v. Belgium).59
Du Plessis begins his argumentation very well. ‘… let us assume that the 
Al-Bashir saga exemplifies a fight for the soul of international criminal law’ - 
which it does. He proceeds:
… The responsible thing for the Republic of South Africa to have done 
was to avoid the conflict all together. The Republic of South Africa could 
have done this by not allowing its territory to be used for purposes of 
Bashir’s visit- either by declining to host the meeting when it knew that 
Bashir was intent on visiting under encouragement of the au, or by warn-
ing Bashir that he may well face possible arrest if he insisted on coming. 
But that didn’t happen, and history has now been written.60
According to this argument, the Republic of South Africa should abandon her 
responsibility to foster international relations with the au and within its re-
gion. Short of that it should constrain its diplomatic function internally and 
externally. But for what benefit? The icj stated in the Arrest Warrant Case that 
international law is there to enhance States’ diplomatic relations with other 
States, and not to constrain them. That is one of international law’s foremost 
functions. It is repeatedly rehearsed in cardinal international agreements, in-
cluding the un Charter,61 the un Declaration on Principles of international 
law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States,62 etc. The 
icj stated:
58 icc Press Release of 21 September 2010, ‘President of the Assembly of States Parties meets 
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Kenya’ Doc icc-asp-20100921-pr575 (emphasis added).
59 Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (drc v. Belgium), Judgment of 14 Febru-
ary 2002, International Court of Justice, I.C.J. Reports 2002, p. 3.
60 Du Plessis, supra note 8, p. 437 (emphasis added).
61 Charter of the United Nations (1945) 1 unts xvi.
62 un Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-
operation among States (24 October 1970) un General Assembly Resolution 2525, un Doc. 
A/res/25/2625.
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As in the case of the warrant’s issue, its international circulation from June 
2000 by the Belgian authorities, given its nature and purpose, effectively 
infringed Mr. Yerodia’s immunity as the Congo’s incumbent  Minister for 
Foreign Affairs and was furthermore liable to affect the Congo’s conduct 
of its international relations. Since: Mr. Yerodia was called upon in that 
capacity to undertake travel in the performance of his duties, the mere 
international circulation of the warrant, even in the absence of ‘further 
steps’ by Belgium, could have resulted, in particular, in his arrest while 
abroad. …. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the circulation of the war-
rant, whether or not it significantly interfered with Mr. Yerodia’s diplomatic 
activity, constituted a violation of an obligation of Belgium towards the 
Congo, in that it failed to respect the immunity of the incumbent Minis-
ter for Foreign Affairs of the Congo and, more particularly, infringed the 
immunity from criminal jurisdiction and the inviolability then enjoyed 
by him under international law.63
It is clear that international law’s function is to maximise capacity for inter-
State engagement rather than to minimise, hinder or dwindle it. Antagonizing 
the regional body and minimizing the Republic of South Africa’s relations in 
the world is the legacy of apartheid South Africa’s regimes. This is not to be 
encouraged in the post-apartheid era, no matter how used to that approach 
others may be.
In the face of unparalleled hostile defiance by a group of States that had 
most helped the Rome Statute achieve the 60 ratifications required to bring 
it into force, the icc must definitely be reaching for its own pulse for life. No 
other international judicial tribunal has suffered this level of existential threat, 
especially in its embryonic phase.
icc non-compliance problems are not dissociated from what is now vis-
ibly showing as the poor drafting of the Rome Statute (1998). The current 
non-cooperation challenges have forced these drafting deficiencies to the 
surface. In particular, the drafters failed to inscribe into the procedural dy-
namic of the Court, the nemo judex in parte sua principle, itself a General 
Principle of Law recognized by civilized nations – Article 38(1)(c) of the 
Statute of the icj.
63 Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (drc v. Belgium), Judgment of 14 
 February 2002, International Court of Justice, I.C.J. Reports 2002, para. 71 (emphasis 
added).
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3 Basic Principles of law recognized by civilized nations: Article 38(1)
(c) Statute of the International Court of Justice (icj)64
Although Article 1 of the Statute of the icj (1945) is specific to the icj itself, it 
has evolved into customary international law on the sources of international 
law that govern the practice of international tribunals.65
Although treaties and customary international law have dominated dis-
course on sources for a while now, Schlesinger writes that the ‘general prin-
ciples’ referred to in sub-paragraph (c) of the Statute of the icj ‘are a primary 
source, [and] often the only source of international law in the absence of an 
applicable treaty’.66 And even where a treaty could apply, its interpretation 
may depend upon resort to the General Principles of Law recognized by civi-
lized nations.67 Cherif Bassiouni writes that, going forward General Principles 
of Law recognized by civilised nations will likely become the seminal source of 
international law because:
As the world’s interdependence increases, there will doubtless be greater 
reliance on international law as a means to resolve a variety of issues 
which neither conventional nor customary international law is ready to 
meet. The fast pace of human rights will also bring to the forefront of in-
ternational, regional, and national adjudication issues which heretofore 
may have only been viewed as theoretical. The four most pressing issues 
that will advance to the forefront … are: human rights, the environment, 
economic development, and international and transnational criminality. 
Even the casual observer will note that in these four areas, conventional 
and customary international law have not developed the framework, 
norms, or rules necessary to regulate these issues, nor is it likely that 
these two sources of law will catch up with the needs of the time. Thus, 
64 See especially R.B. Schlesinger, ‘Research on the General Principles of Law Recognized 
by Civilized Nations’, 51 American Journal of International Law (1957) 734–753; F.T.F. Jalet, 
‘The Quest for the General Principles of Law Recognized by Civilized Nations – A Study’, 
10 University of California Los Angeles Law Review (1963) 1042–1086; Christopher A. Ford, 
‘Judicial Discretion in International jurisprudence: Article 38(1)(c) and General Principles 
of Law’, 5 Duke Journal of International and Comparative Law (1994) 35–86; Jain, supra 
note 17, pp. 111–150; M. Cherif Bassiouni, ‘A Functional Approach to General Principles of 
International Law’, 11 Michigan Journal of International Law (1989–1990) 768–818.
65 James Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of International Law (ed. 8th ed. oup, Oxford, 2012) 
p. 23. See also Schlesinger, supra note 64, p. 734.
66 Schlesinger, ibid. p. 735.
67 Ibid.
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it is quite likely that ‘General Principles’ will become the most important 
and influential source of international law … Existing needs and conflicts 
will necessarily require some legal basis for their satisfaction and reso-
lution. In this case, the definition, identification, and functional use of 
‘General Principles, will require more rigorous attention than has thus 
far been given to these questions. For the same reasons, greater rigor will 
be demanded of the rather loose manner in which jus cogens has been 
defined, identified, and applied by various writers.68
General principles of law derive from a common expression of national legal 
systems.69 They have been defined invariably as those ‘cardinal principles of 
the legal system, in the light of which international law is to be interpreted and 
applied’; and also as ‘obvious maxims of jurisprudence of a general and funda-
mental character’.70 Yet others have characterised them as being the equivalent 
of an international common law sprouting out of the core concepts, norms 
and rules of national legal systems.71 They are ‘foundational ordering norms in 
a global, interdependent community’.72
These principles are immutable because they derive from, and are the com-
monest principles emanating from municipal legal systems of nation States. 
According to Jalet, they are ‘… foundational and underlie all legal systems, for 
there should be no divergence – they are everywhere the same. … They are 
law in both the national and international spheres, and it is these principles 
to which Article 38(1)(c) refers to’.73 Schlesinger perceives them as the general 
standards of legal and judicial decency that ‘civilized nations recognize in their 
municipal legal systems, and sometimes in collective declarations’.74
They take the form of substantive standards as well as procedural and evi-
dentiary principles which are felt to be inherent in all civilized legal systems. 
68 Cherif Bassiouni, supra note 64, pp. 768–818, p. 769. Discussing the increasing sig-
nificance to dispute resolution in the wto dispute settlement system, see also Ma-
ria Panezi, ‘Sources of Law in Transition Re‐visiting General Principles of Interna-
tional Law’, (2007) ancilia juriS at Researchgate, <www.researchgate.net/publica 
tion/26495501_Sources_of_Law_in_Transition_-_Re-visiting_General_Principles_of_Inter 
national_Law>, accessed 17 July 2018.
69 Ibid., p. 768.
70 Ibid., p. 770.
71 Ibid., p. 772.
72 Ibid., p. 773.
73 Jalet, supra note 64, pp. 1075–1076.
74 Schlesinger, supra note 64, p. 736.
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It is the generality of their application that determines their status as a general 
principle and not the generality of the legal idea underlying it.75 Bassiouni con-
cludes that: ‘if a principle exists in most national laws, it is likewise inherently 
part of the structure of international law, which can best regulate the conduct 
of States by applying those principles which are recognized by these States’.76 
Equity, Fairness, Proportionality, and Human Rights are good examples of 
common expressions of all national legal systems.77
Cherif Bassiouni provides a non-exhaustive list of possible functions of gen-
eral principles of law in the international legal system.78 This writer would add 
to that list, the assurance of integrity and legitimacy to the sphere of law under 
consideration, especially by upholding the requirement of natural justice.
Across both civil law and common law jurisdictions, the doctrine of natural 
justice is applied to monitor and to critique law for fairness of its standards and 
procedures; and for its consistency with requirements of the principle of the 
rule-of-law.79 According to The Secretary General of the un, the  rule-of-law is:
… a principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and enti-
ties, public and private, including the State itself, are accountable to laws 
that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently adju-
dicated, and which are consistent with international human rights norms 
and standards. It requires, as well, measures to ensure adherence to the 
principles of supremacy of law, equality before the law, accountability to 
the law, fairness in the application of the law, separation of powers, par-
ticipation in decision-making, legal certainty, avoidance of arbitrariness 
and procedural and legal transparency.80
Under English law, natural justice refers to the general duty to act fairly. Fair-
ness is ensured by two doctrines, namely, the rule against bias - nemo judex in 
parte sua; and the right to a fair hearing - audi alteram partem.
75 Jalet, supra note 64, p. 1046.
76 Cherif Bassiouni, supra note 64, p. 773.
77 See also Jalet, supra note 64, pp. 1044–50.
78 Cherif Bassiouni, supra note 64, pp. 775–6.
79 See also Tom Bingham, The Rule of Law (Penguin, London, 2011).
80 United Nations and the Rule of Law, ‘What is the Rule of Law’, <https://www.un.org/
ruleoflaw/what-is-the-rule-of-law/>, (emphasis added), accessed 17 July 2018.
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In Pinochet No. 2,81 the uk Supreme Court – House of Lords as it then was – 
ruled that the relationship between Amnesty International and Lord  Hoffmann 
automatically disqualified him from hearing the case. Therefore, an earlier 
judgment could not stand. This was because Amnesty International had been 
granted leave to act as interveners in the case. After judgment was announced 
new disclosures showed that one of the five judges – Lord  Hoffman – was an 
unpaid director and chairperson of Amnesty International Charity Limited 
and that his wife was employed by Amnesty International.
This led General Pinochet to challenge the Court’s finding on the grounds 
that Lord Hoffmann should have declared his connections to Amnesty Inter-
national because those links were sufficient to give rise to the appearance of 
possible bias. The possibility of bias, and not the proof of it, was sufficient to 
cast doubt on the integrity of earlier proceedings. The matter of the Span-
ish Magistrate’s application for extradition of Senator Pinochet Ugarte to 
Spain to answer charges of universal jurisdiction offences allegedly com-
mitted while head of the State of Chile had to be reheard in open court, all 
over again. This is how significant the nemo judex in parte sua principle is 
in practice.
Malleson82 has criticised the judgment for attacking the integrity of very 
senior judges. This writer does not share that view. The judgment appears to 
prudently inscribe rather than exclude, as Malleson’s suggestion might, the 
General Principle of Law recognized by civilized nations - itself a cardinal re-
quirement of natural justice, namely, that justice must not only be done, but 
must be seen to be done. This is a well-established and ancient requirement of 
Administrative Law wherever one looks.
In Rex v. Sussex Justices, ex parte McCarthy, D had been prosecuted for dan-
gerous driving. Unknown to the defendant and his solicitors, the Clerk to the 
Justices was a member of the firm of solicitors acting in a civil claim against D. 
The claim had arisen out of the accident that had given rise to D’s prosecution. 
The Clerk retired with the Justices, who returned to convict D as charged. On 
learning of the Clerk’s provenance, D applied to have the conviction quashed. 
The Justices swore affidavits stating that they had reached their decision to 
convict D without the involvement of their Clerk.
81 Regina v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No 2), 
15 Jan 1999, hl, [1999] All er 577.
82 Kate Malleson, ‘Judicial Bias and Disqualification after Pinochet No.2’, 63(1) Modern 
Law Review (2000) 119–127. See also <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/toc/14682230/2000 
/63/1>.
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Per Lord Hewart cj:
It is said, and, no doubt, truly, that when that gentleman retired in the 
usual way with the justices, taking with him the notes of the evidence in 
case the justices might desire to consult him, the justices came to a con-
clusion without consulting him, and that he scrupulously abstained from 
referring to the case in any way. But while that is so, a long line of cases 
shows that it is not merely of some importance but is of fundamental im-
portance that justice should not only be done, but should manifestly and 
undoubtedly be seen to be done. The question therefore is not whether 
in this case the deputy clerk made any observation or offered any criti-
cism which he might not properly have made or offered; the question 
is whether he was so related to the case in its civil aspect as to be unfit 
to act as clerk to the justices in the criminal matter. The answer to that 
question depends not upon what actually was done but upon what might 
appear to be done. Nothing is to be done which creates even a suspicion 
that there has been an improper interference with the course of justice. 
Speaking for myself, I accept the statements contained in the justices’ 
affidavit, but they show very clearly that the deputy clerk was connected 
with the case in a capacity which made it right that he should scrupu-
lously abstain from referring to the matter in any way, although he retired 
with the justices; in other words, his one position was such that he could 
not, if he had been required to do so, discharge the duties which his other 
position involved. His twofold position was a manifest contradiction. In 
those circumstances, I am satisfied that this conviction must be quashed, 
unless it can be shown that the applicant or his solicitor was aware of the 
point that might be taken, refrained from taking it, and took his chance 
of an acquittal on the facts, and then, on a conviction being recorded, 
decided to take the point. On the facts, I am satisfied that there has been 
no waiver of the irregularity, and, that being so, the rule must be made 
absolute and the conviction quashed.83
Integrity of the law deserves a higher priority than presumed human integ-
rity, no matter how esteemed the humans in question may be. The two should 
never be confused or, conflated. On the contrary, one should always be mindful 
of the distinction. While the law’s integrity rests on its own evolution and de-
velopment through interpretive reasoning that is refined over time to arrive at 
83 Rex v. Sussex Justices, ex parte McCarthy [1923] All er 233, [1924] 1 kb 256 (emphasis 
added).
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cogent principles that inspire objective confidence in their dictates; judges as 
humans are mere mortals whose inclinations, no matter how outstanding they 
might be, can never be compared under the same light to law’s independent 
and separable integrity.
For instance, a judge may fall from grace and never again be allowed to prac-
tice law. However, any decisions s/he may have handed down will not fall with 
her/him; neither would any persons he might have sentenced to lengthy prison 
terms be released because s/he has fallen from grace. His/her seminal judg-
ments would continue to influence the course of justice because they belong 
to law’s interpretive logic, and not to the judge herself/himself for they were 
only a servant of the process to progress law and justice’s purposes.
Judges are dependent on law’s integrity for the public appropriation of their 
own judgments. The law does not and cannot depend on their perceived in-
tegrity for its own integrity. Neither does the law depend on judges’ personal 
integrity to be valid. It is not a case of ‘this is a good judgment because it was 
made by the venerable Judge X.’ For this reason, judges have to justify their rul-
ings with legal reasoning that can be tested and challenged by others, includ-
ing their peers, for consistency with the valid laws of the legal environment 
that they are operating in.
Moreover, the correct interpretation of the basis of the bias test is that it is 
not the integrity of the judge(s) that is at issue, but rather, the independent 
perception of an onlooker, and what s/he would conclude would happen if the 
circumstances of the judges were made known to her/him.
The prohibition against bias is a fundamental requirement of administra-
tive law and human rights law. It is critical to justice so that even the mere 
suspicion of bias or, the mere apprehension of it is sufficient to require the 
setting aside of the affected judgment(s). In other words, judgments are im-
mediately corrupted and deemed as invalid by the mere apprehension of bias, 
and not the proof of it. This threshold is much, much lower than the criminal 
law culpability test of beyond reasonable doubt. It is much, much lower than 
the balance of probability test applied in civil law claims.
The Supreme Court of Canada has characterised the essence of impartiality 
and bias as:
… the requirement of the judge to approach the case to be adjudicated 
with an open mind. Conversely, bias or prejudice has been defined as a 
leaning, inclination, bent or predisposition towards one side or another or 
a particular result. In its application to legal proceedings, it represents a 
predisposition to decide an issue or cause in a certain way, which does not 
leave the judicial mind perfectly open to conviction. Bias is a  condition or 
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state of mind, which sways judgment and renders a judicial officer unable to 
exercise his or her functions impartially in a particular case.84
The supreme importance to law’s integrity of the requirement of judicial 
 independence and impartiality is underlined in that it has a very low thresh-
old  – the mere apprehension of bias test.85 This suggests that the law’s own 
 integrity depends upon the absolute rejection of bias in its practice. Such 
 integrity has nothing at all to do with the recognition or protection of the in-
tegrity of individuals that may be involved in the pursuit of justice.
Administrative law’s doctrine of recusal of judges manifests inter alia the 
unreliability of pointing to judges’ own integrity over law’s own integrity. Judg-
es often miss it that their personal circumstances are so linked to the facts of 
the case in a manner that triggers the apprehension of bias.
The test to be applied in determining whether a judge is disqualified by 
reason of the appearance of bias is whether a fair-minded lay observer 
might reasonably apprehend that the judge might not bring an impartial 
and unprejudiced mind to the resolution of the question the judge is re-
quired to determine.86
The High Court of Australia stated in Livesey v. New South Wales Bar Associa-
tion87 that ‘… a fair-minded observer might entertain a reasonable apprehen-
sion of bias by reason of pre-judgment if a judge sits to hear a case at first 
instance after he has, in a previous case, expressed clear views either about 
a question of fact which constitutes a live and significant issue in the subse-
quent case or about the credit of a witness whose evidence is of significance on 
such a question of fact’. Justice Eder stated in Otkritie International Investment 
Management Ltd v. Urumov that ‘… cases in which there is any real ground for 
doubt should be resolved in favour of recusal. [However,] …A judge should 
decline to hear a case only for proper and sufficient reason to do so: recusal is 
not an excuse for avoiding embarrassment’.88
84 Elizabeth Plomp v. Centre Hospitalier de St. Mary, Supreme Court of Canada, 2014 qccs 
6506.
85 See also Supreme Court of Canada decision 2747–3174 Québec Inc. v. Québec (Régie des 
permis d'alcool) [1996] 3 S.C.R. 919.
86 Ninan v. Valuer General (wa) [No 2] [2016]wascA 170 [20]; see also Johnson v. Johnson 
[2000], hca 48, (2000) 201 clr 488 [11].
87 Livesey v. New South Wales Bar Association (1983) 151 clr 288, p. 300.
88 Otkritie International Investment Management Ltd v. Urumov, High Court of Justice, 
Queen’s Bench Division Commercial Court, 29 April 20142014 wl 1219815.
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Despite the injunction that, in recusal matters, Judges should lean always ‘…
on the side of being safe rather than sorry’,89 judges are not unknown to refuse 
to recuse themselves,90 even when their own peers suggest it to them that the 
circumstances required it.
The reasonable apprehension of bias test has evolved to ensure impartial 
and independent hearings91 particularly in human rights cases involving the 
application of quasi-judicial powers by statutory bodies.92
The Supreme Court of Canada93 held that the reasonable apprehension of 
bias had been satisfied where employees of the Liquor Control Board which 
had power to revoke liquor licences had participated in every stage of the com-
plaint process, including the investigation and the filing of complaints, the 
presentation of the case before the directors, and the making of the board’s 
decision. The Court quashed the Board’s decision for failure to comply with 
the requirement to ensure ‘independent and impartial hearing’ - contrary to 
human rights law.94
Section 23 of the Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms (Que.) provides that 
every person has the right to a hearing by an independent and impartial tri-
bunal for the determination of his or her rights and obligations. Section 56(1) 
provides that a tribunal, for the purposes of Section  23, includes an agency 
exercising quasi-judicial functions. The guarantee to impartial, unbiased, in-
dependent consideration of matters alleged against anyone is not limited to 
courts and tribunals. Rather, its extension to agencies exercising quasi-judicial 
89 awg Group v. Morrison [2006] 1 wlr 1163, p. 9.
90 See also Otkritie International Investment Management Ltd v. Urumov, High Court 
of  Justice, Queen’s Bench Division Commercial Court, 29 April 2014 wl 1219815; JSC 
BTA Bank v. Ablyazov, Court of Appeal (Civil Division) 27 November 2012 [2012] wl 
5894506.
91 See also Article 2(1) International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 
1966, 999 unts 171.; Article 8(1) Organisation of American States, American Convention 
on Human Rights (22 November 1969); Article 6 European Convention on Human Rights 
(1950); echr ‘Guide on Article 6 of the echr’, echr website <http://www.echr.coe.int/
Documents/Guide_Art_6_ENG.pdf>; see also International Commission of Jurists, Practi-
tioner’s Guide No. 1 ‘International Principles on the Independence and Accountability of 
Judges, Lawyers and Prosecutors’, www.refworld.org/pdfid/4a7837af2.pdf.
92 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 32, U.N. Doc. ccpr/C/gc/32 (2007), Ar-
ticle 14: Right to equality before courts and tribunals and to a fair trial.
93 2747–3174 Québec Inc. v. Québec (Régie des permis d'alcool) [1996] 3 S.C.R. 919.
94 Including the Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, R.S.Q., c. c-12, ss. 23, 56(1)—Act 
respecting liquor permits, R.S.Q., c. P-9.1, ss. 2, 75, 86(8).
Downloaded from Brill.com03/05/2019 12:55:19PM
via Brunel University
 27A NEMO JUDEX IN PARTE SUA | doi 10.1163/15718123-01806004
international criminal law review (2018) 1-33
204248
functions reflects its paramountcy to fairness in all matters that affect funda-
mental rights of individuals.
The un Human Rights Committee is comprised of 18 independent experts 
tasked with monitoring and enhancing State compliance with their obligations 
under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966).95 Hu-
man Rights Committee General Comment No. 32 of 23 August 2007 simplifies 
for States the requirements that they must satisfy in order to ensure fairness 
in the practice of courts and tribunals as a means to safeguard the rule-of-law. 
It states that the equal treatment of parties applies regardless of the nature of 
proceedings before such bodies. ‘Article 14 contains guarantees that States par-
ties must respect, regardless of their legal traditions and their domestic law … 
[and] … a general reservation to the right to a fair trial would be incompatible 
with the object and purpose of the Covenant’.96
Paragraph 18 of the General Comment states that: ‘The notion of a “tribu-
nal” in Article 14, paragraph 1 designates a body, regardless of its denomina-
tion, that is established by law, is independent of the executive and legislative 
branches of government or enjoys in specific cases judicial independence in 
deciding legal matters in proceedings that are judicial in nature’.97
The International Commission of Jurists too has focused on this requirement 
and published an elaborate Practitioner’s Guide on International  Principles 
on the Independence and Accountability of Judges, Lawyers and Prosecutor.98 
The reasonable apprehension of bias test has evolved in the jurisprudence on 
the prohibition against bias to ensure impartial and independent hearings 
 particularly in human rights cases involving quasi-judicial statutory bodies.
The icc fits all of the above descriptors. Its own integrity as a judicial tribu-
nal depends also upon its demonstration that it adheres to the tenets of fair 
and impartial practice that can never be impugned in the slightest by accusa-
tions of apprehension of bias. However, the 6 July 2017 decision of Trial Cham-
ber ii in a matter against a msp of the Rome Statute (1998) raises enormous 
doubt about the Court’s recognition of the requirements of the nemo judex in 
parte sua principle of fairness and natural justice.
Firstly, the Court alleged that the Republic of South Africa had breached ar-
ticles on cooperation by failing to honour icc requests to arrest and  surrender 
95 Established under Articles 28 and 29 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, 16 December 1966, 999 unts 171.
96 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 32, Article 14: Right to equality before 
courts and tribunals and to a fair trial, U.N. Doc. ccpr/C/gc/32 (2007).
97 Ibid.
98 International Commission of Jurists, supra note 91.
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President Al Bashir during his visit of June 2015. The Court then presided over 
the proceedings. The Court reached the decision that indeed the Republic 
of South Africa had prevented it from doing its work by failing to arrest and 
surrender, as requested by itself, President Al Bashir while in the Republic of 
South Africa to attend an au Summit.
This writer contends that these highly qualified and seasoned practitioners 
could not have been unaware of the apprehension of bias in what they were 
doing. Rather, survival instincts, similar to those observed in the early years of 
the icj99 must have overtaken their renowned wits and jointly focused them 
on politico-vivere-reflexes. They found immediate support for these instincts 
in woefully drafted Article 87 of the Rome Statute which must be amended 
to ensure that the Court’s powers do not conflict with the general principle of 
judicial practice, namely, nemo judex in parte sua, itself a fundamental require-
ment of the principle of the rule of law.100
This was not the First time that the icc had considered the question of non-
cooperation with the Court by an African State and reached a similar decision. 
In December 2011, the icc’s Pre-Trial Chamber I considered violations by Chad 
and Malawi for failure in each case to cooperate with the icc upon the Court’s 
requests to arrest and surrender Al Bashir when he had visited their respective 
territories.101 Six years later, the icc has repeated the same unconscionable 
procedure. This is a worrying development. The icc cannot maintain this 
practice without undermining international criminal legal practice’s very own 
integrity. If the icc continues on this path, it might reduce itself to a body 
whose edicts are devoid of judicial credibility, confidence or legitimacy.
4 Nemo judex in parte sua principle and the Case for Reform 
of Article 87(7)
The duty to cooperate with the icc is unequivocal. Article 86 provides 
that: ‘States Parties shall, in accordance with the provisions of this Statute, 
99 Corfu Channel (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. Albania), 9 April 
1949, International Court of Justice, icj Reports 1949.
100 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 32 (23 August 2007) U.N. Doc. ccpr/ 
C/gc/32, paras. 2 and 4.
101 The Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, 12 December 2011, icc, Pre-Trial Cham-
ber I, 02/05–01/09 (Malawi non-compliance with icc request for the arrest and surrender 
of President Al Bashir); The Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, 13 December 
2011, icc, Pre-Trial Chamber I, 02/05–01/09 (Chad non-compliance with icc request for 
the arrest and surrender of President Al Bashir).
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 cooperate fully with the Court in its investigation and prosecution of crimes 
within the jurisdiction of the Court’. The imperative mood of the verb used 
suggests that the duty may be absolute, leaving msps no room for delibera-
tion. If this is correct, msp’s failure to cooperate with the icc upon request 
for assistance would be a serious breach of their obligations under the Rome 
Statute (1998) and under customary international law’s pacta sunt servanda 
principle.
By Article 87, the plenipotentiaries sought to address the potential that 
msps might refuse as African States have done, to cooperate with the icc. Sub-
paragraph 7 of that Article provides that:
Where a State Party fails to comply with a request to cooperate by the 
Court contrary to the provisions of this Statute, thereby preventing 
the Court from exercising its functions and powers under this Statute, the 
Court may make a finding to that effect and refer the matter to the Assem-
bly of States Parties or, where the Security Council referred the matter to 
the Court, to the Security Council.
The provision is based on, and driven by three assumptions. The first is that a 
State has failed to comply. Such circumstance would trigger the operation of 
87(7). But the trigger requires a prior determination, namely, that a State has 
already defaulted. Neither the presumption of innocence nor, the possibility 
of extraneous circumstances is inscribed into this provision. It implies instead 
that the State always has at its disposal the unhindered power to cooperate. It 
implies also, the unequivocal supremacy of icc law over msps.
The second bias-ridden trigger is that the icc has to impute to the alleg-
edly defaulting State its own failures. This is unconscionable because icc ar-
rest warrants against President Al Bashir for instance, have languished unen-
forced since 2009. For six years before the fugitive visited the Republic of South 
Africa, the Court had been unable to enforce those arrest warrants, and there-
fore not been able to prosecute President Al Bashir. According to the wording 
of Article 87(7) it suddenly becomes the Republic of South Africa in 2015, that 
has ‘hindered the icc from prosecuting the Sudanese President’, and therefore 
responsible under international law for the Court’s own six-year-long failure to 
bring its declared fugitive to book.
This raises an apprehension of unfair blame against the Republic of South 
Africa for international law’s own weaknesses in that its ambition to prosecute 
those suspected of having incurred international criminal responsibility un-
der its criminal code has not been matched yet by a corresponding boldness 
to achieve that ambition. Thus, it seeks to pass the blame onto States that find 
Downloaded from Brill.com03/05/2019 12:55:19PM
via Brunel University
doi 10.1163/15718123-01806004 | Chigara
international criminal law review (2018) 1-33
204248
30
themselves in the Republic of South Africa’s position, the responsibility for in-
ternational law’s own inherent weaknesses.
Consequently, these States are blamed for being in the quandary of hav-
ing to balance the competing obligations arising from their supranational law 
obligations and also from their icc obligations. The Court of Justice of the Eu-
ropean Union prioritized supranational law over international law in the Kadi 
cases.102
Where the icc has gone for six or more years without succeeding to bring 
an accused person to book, the blame should lie with the still weak and feeble 
nature of international law to achieve its ambitious programme103 to prosecute 
those alleged to have committed heinous crimes of concern to all of humanity. 
No matter how desirable and agreeable such a programme may be, without 
establishing a sufficient operational mechanism, its promises will remain illu-
sory. Blaming the Republic of South Africa, which is mired up in contradicting 
supranational obligations which supposedly trump international law obliga-
tions per Kadi Case, appears to be childish nonsense. It does not deal with the 
challenge of the chasm between the ambition to prosecute Article 5 crimes of 
the Rome Statute (1998), and the lamentable absence of a sufficient mecha-
nism to bring accused persons to the Court.
Pre-Trial Chamber ii’s 6 July 2017 decision against the Republic of South 
Africa appears to be a desperate attempt to fudge the current underdevelop-
ment of international law, and the impotence of the icc. This probability has 
opened up a can of worms for the icc and non-cooperating au msps that are 
also icc msps are exploiting this malaise to defy the Court; leaving the reputa-
tion of the Court tainted.
The approach of the icc in this case lends itself to criticism of exhibiting 
existentialist-vivere reflexes rather than the preferred sound judicial practice 
that inscribes General Principles of Law recognised by civilized nations – 
Article 38(1)(c), Statute of the icj (1945). This writer does not imagine that the 
learned judges at the icc are unaware of the apprehension of bias consequent 
upon a resort to exercising Article 87(7) powers against a msp of the Rome 
Statute (1998). However, faced with challenges to its own legitimacy, Pre-Trial 
Chamber ii - like Pre-Trial Chamber I before it in the Chad and Malawi cases 
of 2011 - chose to ignore application of the nemo judex in parte sua principle to 
the matters before it.
This raises two immediate issues. One is the defective drafting of Article 
87(7) of the Rome Statute (1998). This provision should inscribe rather than 
102 Supra section 2.3.
103 Flagging the challenges, see especially Jain, supra note 17, pp. 114–116.
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exclude operation of the requirements of nemo judex in parte sua. Secondly, it 
points to the enduring fault-line of deficient or poor enforcement mechanisms 
in international law. New challenges will demand resolute responses to both 
of these issues.
Enforcement of icc arrest warrants should not be a burden for msps whose 
sentiment not to prosecute may be widely shared in their regional contexts. 
That only leads to the criminalization of msps for failing to accomplish some-
thing no single State can sometimes perform, particularly under the compel-
ling rudiments of supranational law. To purposively interpret Article 87(7) as 
requiring msps to individually accomplish something that the international 
collective manifestly appears inept at accomplishing for itself is patently 
ridiculous.
un Security Council in-action following Pre-Trial Chamber I’s referrals of 
both Chad and Malawi’s earlier non-cooperation with the icc over President 
Al Bashir raises questions about the independence of a Court of law that pleads 
to political authority of the Executive for sanctions against non-cooperating 
States. It would be helpful to rid the Court of this dependence.
Often, political measures have a completely different set of checks and bal-
ances. What is acceptable in the political arena may be totally unacceptable in 
the judicial arena. Often, political instincts dictate and shape procedures in the 
political environment. However, consistency, transparency and predictability 
dictate and shape legal environments for dispute resolution. What is required 
is that international law should now cross bridges that it has hitherto hesitated 
to cross, particularly on the enforcement of international criminal law. Other-
wise it is inconceivable that the icc project will be very successful.
5 Conclusions
This article examined icc practice on Article 87(7) of the Rome Statute, under 
the light of the nemo judex in parte sua principle. The discussion showed that 
justice is possible only when that practice follows the course of fairness by ad-
hering to the strictures of the doctrine of natural justice. Natural justice refers 
to the functional element of law, which is to endear legal practice with integ-
rity (faultlessness) and legitimacy (voluntary compliance of law’s addressees). 
It has been summed up as the general duty to act fairly. Fairness in proceedings 
is ensured by two doctrines, namely, the rule against bias - nemo judex in parte 
sua; and the right to a fair hearing - audi alteram partem.
A tentative survey of domestic Courts’ practice on the duty to act fairly 
(to determine general practice of States) showed extreme sensitivity to the 
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 strictures of the nemo judex in parte sua principle. Recognition of, and adher-
ence to that principle made it overwhelmingly synonymous with a litmus test 
for justice in judicial proceedings. It also reinforces the human right to be tried 
by an independent and impartial tribunal. Nemo judex in parte sua is inextri-
cable to the principle of the rule of law. It is a requirement championed by all 
human rights regimes.
The hrc, a body of experts that monitors State compliance with their obli-
gations under the un iccpr (1966) has focused its work on this requirement 
and produced a coherent crystallization of its interpretation of this require-
ment in General Comment 32 on the interpretation of Article 14 on the right 
to fair trial. General Comments of the un hrc are intended as authoritative 
guidance to States on the correct interpretation of treaty provisions.
According to the un hrc the equal treatment of parties ‘… applies regardless 
of the nature of proceedings’. Moreover,
Article 14 contains guarantees that States parties must respect, regardless 
of their legal traditions and their domestic law …. [and] … a general res-
ervation to the right to a fair trial would be incompatible with the object 
and purpose of the Covenant.104
In three major cases – Chad, Malawi, and more recently the Republic of South 
Africa – Article 87(7) was invoked to charge each of these three States with 
non-cooperation with icc requests for assistance to apprehend and surrender 
a fugitive. In each case the icc found against the respondents and averred that 
by their conduct, each of the respondents had therefore prevented the Court 
from exercising its functions and powers under the Statute. The icc’s unques-
tioning implementation of Article 87(7) appears to contradict the nemo judex 
in parte sua requirement - itself a core principle of the requirement of natural 
justice, or the requirement to act fairly.
If this is correct, then Article 87(7) of the Rome Statute (1998) appears not 
to currently fully inscribe the requirements of natural justice, particularly the 
strictures of nemo judex in parte sua – a General Principle of Law recognized 
by civilized nations and recognized as a seminal source of Law under Article 
38(1)(c) of the Statute of the icj, which has become customary law on the 
sources of international law. For this reason, perhaps a revision or, a redraft-
ing of  Article 87(7) of the Rome Statute (1998) is required to ensure that the 
provision inscribes the strictures of the nemo judex in parte sua principle. This 
104 Supra note 92.
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would  enhance the chances that icc practice will be more consistent with the 
requirements of the nemo judex in parte sua principle.
That, both Pre-Trial Chamber I and Pre-Trial Chamber ii have followed 
what appears under the light of natural justices’ requirements as the flawed 
Article 87(7) logic, shows the Court’s inclination towards  politico-vivere-reflexes 
 observed of the icj in its embryonic phase, particularly its decision in the 
Corfu Channel case (1949). If as we have seen above, impartiality is the core 
 attribute of judicial proceedings,105 then the icc could not insist on exercis-
ing the flawed logic of Article 87(7) without offending the common notions of 
justice.
These peculiar circumstances highlight a very critical moment in the de-
velopment of international law generally, and of international criminal law in 
particular. In the first eight years of its existence the icc did not bring a single 
accused person to trial in spite of several indictments. This points in part to 
the underdevelopment of the international legal system. It cannot yet match 
with a fitting process, its justifiable ambition to prosecute those alleged to have 
committed heinous crimes of concern to all of humanity. The Al Bashir case 
before the icc shows severe weaknesses in the icc dynamic to achieve its mis-
sion. No matter how desirable and agreeable the icc project may be, without 
providing a sufficient operational dynamic for its functions, its promises will 
remain pie in the sky and illusory.
Finally, two things need addressing. One is the defective drafting of  Article 
87(7) so that it inscribes the requirements of the nemo judex in parte sua prin-
ciple. The second is to deal with international law’s enduring fault-line,  namely, 
enforcement strategies. This fault-line can no longer subsist. Enforcement 
of icc arrest warrants should not remain a burden for msps. The Al Bashir 
case has proven this to be an extremely unreliable Walter Mitty106 approach 
to prosecution of international crimes. To purposively interpret Article 87(7) 
as requiring msps to individually accomplish that, which the international col-
lective appears inept to accomplish, is perplexing and a recipe for failure of the 
icc project.
105 Canadian Judicial Council, supra note 1, pp. 30.
106 See James Thurber, The Secret Life of Walter Mitty (Penguin, London, 1945).
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